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[Abstracts] The paper reviews options with respect to differentiation between beneﬁciaries 
of GSP (tariff preferences for developing countries).  It has for a long time been accepted that the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) may be treated better than other developing countries, but a 
recent WTO dispute indicates that discrimination beyond this is possible if it is based on objective 
criteria related to development. The paper discusses GSP differentiation in the light of this, 
and argues that the most generous preferences are given to a wider group of countries than the 
LDCs. A main reason is that LDCs constitute a small part of the developing world, and 4/5 of the 
world’s poor live outside the LDCs.  Preferences for the poorest should not become an obstacle 
for improved market access for the “second poorest”. The paper discusses possible reforms 
in Norway’s GSP systems in this light. According to objective criteria, the special position of 
Botswana and Namibia in Norway’s current GSP system could be questioned, since e.g. Botswana 
is now an upper middle income country. 
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1. Introduction1 
GSP is intended to be for developing countries. There is, however, no 
unambiguously agreed definition of a developing country. When GSP was 
initiated in the 1960s, the rich man’s club was relatively distinct, and 
concepts such as “Third World” and “developing countries” were 
intuitively clear. This clarity is lost for three reasons:  
- First, fast growth in East Asia has made formerly poor countries such 
as Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea climb high on the income 
scorecards.  
- Second, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe has introduced a 
new group of low and middle income countries in the world economy. 
For example, seven of the ten new EU member states had BNI per 
capita lower than Mexico in 2002, and former Soviet republics are 
further down on the list.  
- A third change is the integration into the world economy of a number 
of small countries and territories, for example small island states that 
vary considerably in terms of development. 
Facing these developments, a number of new questions arise, for example: 
- Are Russia and other former Soviet republics developing countries that 
should benefit from SDT  (Special and Differential Treatment in the 
WTO) and GSP (the Generalized System of Preferences), immediately 
or when they become WTO members? 
- Should countries that grow richer, such as the Asian examples 
mentioned above, be “graduated” from GSP and SDT?  
- How should small island states with a relatively high income level, 
such as e.g. Barbados and Antigua, be treated? 
The issue is conceptual, technical as well as political.  
As shown in Melchior (2005a), there is de facto a considerable extent 
of differentiation within GSP systems. The types of such differentiation 
are (i) special treatment of LDCs; (ii) criteria for country or product 
graduation (in e.g. the U.S. and EU GSP systems); (iii) additional or 
reduced benefits depending on the adherence to certain standards (e.g. 
environmental and social standards in the EU; another list in the USA); 
and (iv) what we may call “grey area differentiation”, i.e. extended 
benefits to specific country groups beyond the LDCs. Examples of this are 
EU’s preferences for the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries, 
USA’s special preferences for Africa under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), or Norway’s special preferences for Botswana 
and Namibia. We call these “grey area” since some of these measures 
have been subject to specific waivers in the WTO (EU’s ACP regime), 
and some have been subject to disputes in the WTO (the previous 
“countries fighting drugs” scheme of the EU in particular – see discussion 
below). In this paper, we review some institutional, legal and economic 
issues related to differentiation. In order to limit the length of the paper, 
we do not – save for some comments at the end – discuss trade policy 
differentiation based on governance criteria. 
                                                 
1 I thank Hege Medin and Per Botolf Maurseth for useful comments to an earlier draft. 
The standard disclaimer applies. 
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In the WTO, it is up to countries themselves to “declare” that they are 
developing countries. In spite of the missing definition of what is a 
developing country, the concept plays an important role in the WTO legal 
system, with a number of special provisions. Beyond the general concept 
of developing countries, the only special category accepted is the Least 
Developed Countries, which benefit from various forms of extended 
preferential treatment.2  
There are nevertheless references to various other forms of 
differentiation in the WTO legal frameworks; for example: 
- In the Appendix of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Subsidies, 
countries with BNI per capita below 1000 USD are given special 
rights. 
This suggests that income-based criteria may in some circumstances be 
legally acceptable in the WTO. 
- In the same agreement, developing countries with a world export share 
below 3.25% for a specific product may be subject to less strict 
disciplines. 
Such market share criteria are extensively used in GSP product 
graduation. They are however controversial among GSP beneficiaries that 
do not enjoy losing their market access. According to some “.. sector and 
country graduation are contrary to the principles of non-graduation and 
non-reciprocity that underpin the GSP and therefore alien to the original 
intentions underlying the GSP concept” (see WTO/COMTD/W/77 p. 21). 
- In the UR Agreement on Agriculture, “net food-importing developing 
countries” is a particular category. 
This is however linked to this specific agreement, and has not been used 
for SDT generally. 
In the mandate from Doha in 2001, there are various references to sub-
categories. For example, the WTO should (our italics added) 
- “..frame responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller 
integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading 
system, and not to create a sub-category of WTO Members..” 
- There is also a reference to “..steps that might be taken within the 
mandate and competence of the WTO to enhance the capacity of the 
multilateral trading system to contribute to a durable solution to the 
problem of external indebtedness of developing and least-developed 
countries.” 
- On technical assistance, it is stated “The delivery of WTO technical 
assistance shall be designed to assist developing and least-developed 
countries and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO 
rules and disciplines, implement obligations and exercise the rights of 
membership, including drawing on the benefits of an open, rules-based 
multilateral trading system. Priority shall also be accorded to small, 
                                                 
2 For an overview of legal WTO provisions on SDT and the LDCs, see WTO (2000). 
There is a sizeable literature on SDT; see e.g. Whalley (1999), Michalopoulos (2000), 
Hart and Dymond (2003), Hoekman et al. (2003). For earlier contributions, see e.g. 
Balassa (1980) and Whalley (1990). 
2. WTO agreements on differentiation 
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vulnerable, and transition economies, as well as to members and 
observers without representation in Geneva.” 
Hence the Doha mandate mentions smallness, vulnerability and 
indebtedness, and refers to transition countries. Observe that the WTO 
ministers explicitly reject the notion of creating a subcategory of small 
countries in addition to LDCs. In the Doha round, there is however a work 
programme on small economies.  
Hence there are hints about and references to various categorisations, 
but only LDCs have obtained a special status. Any change in the current 
rules would imply conflicts. Specifying graduation criteria for the more 
advanced developing countries trigger opposition from countries that may 
lose some of their benefits as well as the institutional affiliation to the 
developing country group. Appointing new categories for special 
treatment creates distributional conflicts among those that are eligible and 
those that are not.  
GSP is unilateral and non-reciprocal and the donors therefore have 
greater leeway as to what may be done. As we shall discuss below, there 
are also limitations as to what kind of discrimination that is legally 
possible under GSP. With the current practice of numerous “grey area” 
measures in the field, an issue is whether conditions for discrimination 
should be more “streamlined”. This is also a matter of technical trade 
barriers: If every GSP donor practices discrimination according to varying 
concepts, for tariffs and possibly also rules of origin, the world trade 
system will really become a “spaghetti bowl”, as some have called it 
already. The system would be simpler if multilateral rules on 
differentiation were made clearer. 
As a point of departure for our examination, it is of interest to review 
some of the different categorisations and definitions related to developing 
countries that have been applied in various contexts. 
The list of LDCs is managed by the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). The criteria for inclusion are currently3 
- 3-year average GNI per capita below 750 USD; 
- score below a certain level for a Human Asset Index (HAI) covering 
nutrition, health, education and adult literacy;  
- score above a certain threshold for an economic vulnerability index 
(EVI), covering fluctuations in agricultural production, fluctuation in 
exports, smallness, export concentration, the exposure to natural 
disasters and finally (less clear to us) the economic importance of non-
traditional activities; 
- countries with a population above 75 million are not eligible. 
The LDC list is reviewed tri-annually, and ECOSOC then sets the 
threshold levels. In order to be included, countries must conform to all 
three criteria. If an existing LDC fails to pass the test for at least two of the 
                                                 
3 See the web page of the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed 
Countries, the Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States, 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/default.htm for more details. 
3. Subgroups of developing countries – a smorgasbord 
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criteria in two consecutive reviews, it would normally be graduated. 
Botswana was the first country to graduate in the 1990s. Senegal and 
Timor-Leste have been added to the list recently, while the Maldives, 
Cape Verde and possibly (pending the next review) Samoa will graduate. 
Among the LDCs, Cape Verde, Samoa and Vanuatu have GNI per capita 
above 1000 USD, while the Maldives is at 2170 USD.  Hence some of the 
LDCs are lower middle income countries.  
Beyond the LDC list, there are currently a number of categorisations 
used for different purposes of development policy. In the WTO work 
programme on small economies, the group of landlocked developing 
countries (LLDCs) have also voiced their interests. These countries 
coordinated their views in a Ministerial meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan in 
2003. In the Cancun Ministerial meeting in 2003, the Trade Ministers of 
the landlocked developing countries presented their views. This was 
followed up in UNCTAD 20044, and the UNCTAD Secretariat has 
undertaken work in the field (UNCTAD 2003). 
The LLDC initiative came as a surprise to the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS), which have also been fighting to obtain better market 
access. The SIDS concept was established by a UN conference at 
Barbados in 1994, leading to the “Declaration of Barbados” and a 
Programme of Action for the SIDS (Hein 2004). The UN has appointed its 
own “High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, the 
Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing 
States”. At least four lists of SIDS exist (see Hein 2004, Encontre 2004), 
however, and the merit of SIDS as a particular category is disputed. Some 
of the UN lists of SIDS actually include countries that are not so small 
(Haiti and the Dominican Republic have populations at 7.5 and 8.7 
millions, respectively), that are not islands (a few continental countries 
were included), not so developing (e.g. Singapore is on the list), and not 
states (a number of territories are included) (see Encontre 2004).  
 Given the increased focus on poverty reduction in global politics, 
LLDC and SIDS are not the only relevant categorisations beyond LDCs. 
One option would be to stick to the World Bank’s income classification, 
shown in Table 1: 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Ministerial Declaration, UNCTAD document TD/409, 13 June 2004. 
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Table 1: The World Bank income classification 
Income range 
Category 
Abbre-
viation 
used 
here 2003 2004 
Number 
of coun-
tries, 
2004 
Examples of 
countries included, 
2004 
Low-
income LIC ≤765$ ≤825$ 59 
Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan 
Lower 
middle 
income  
LMC 766- 3035$ 
826- 
3255$ 54 
Brazil, China, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Namibia, 
Thailand, Ukraine 
Upper 
middle 
income  
UMC 3036- 9385$ 
3255- 
10065$ 40 
Argentina, Botswana, 
Malaysia, Russia 
High 
income none >9385$ >10065$ 55 
Bahamas, Hong 
Kong, Korea, 
Sinngapore 
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm 
 
Relating to this classification, we should observe that: 
- The income thresholds have to be adjusted each year to account for 
inflation. Inflation adjustment is made using average inflation in G-5 
(the “SDR deflator”). 
- Second, exchange rate changes may lead to considerable fluctuations 
for individual countries. The World Bank uses a specific methodology 
(the “Atlas method”) to smooth out such fluctuations, but they still 
matter. For example, Korea has an income according to 2003 data at 
12030 $. In 2002, however, it was only 9930$. The strong change was 
partly due to the dollar depreciation, and it illustrates the role of  
annual exchange rate changes . 
A more fundamental question is where the income thresholds come from. 
Why is the low-income threshold now 825$ and not, say, 900$? 
According to the World Bank, its thresholds were mainly set 30 years ago 
as lending criteria. The low-income category is the threshold for allowing 
domestic preferences in bidding under World Bank lending.5 The 
threshold between lower and upper middle income countries is the 
threshold for 15-year IBRD loans. The high-income threshold was set at 
6000$ per capita in 1989. The original thresholds were based on a study of 
the relationship between income and other indicators of well-being, such 
as poverty incidence and infant mortality.6 The choice of thresholds was 
also influenced by “resource availability”. We interpret this in the sense 
that the low-end group should not be so broadly defined that it would be a 
problem for lending capacity. There has been some later adjustment, but 
mainly just to account for inflation.  
Hence even with the World Bank income criteria, we cannot escape 
from the fact that thresholds have to be based on some other 
considerations than income. Table 2 shows some other “hybrid” country 
                                                 
5 See §2.55 in World Bank, 2004, Procurement under IBRD loans and IDA credits, 
available at www.worldbank.org. 
6 See http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/history.htm. 
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classifications used for aid purposes, based on income combined with 
other criteria:  
 
Table 2: Other classifications related to developing countries 
Name Criteria/ explanation Number 
LICUS:Low-
income 
countries under 
stress 
Low-income countries with particularly weak 
governance, with a low score on certain indexes used 
by the World Bank.7 Used by the World Bank 
recently. 
13 
(2003) 
IDA 
(International 
Development 
Association) 
This is the list of countries qualified for interest-free 
loans and grants from, an affiliate of the World Bank. 
There are currently 81 IDA countries.8 IDA countries 
are selected on the basis of income (currently BNI per 
capita below 865 USD), creditworthiness and 
indicators on governance. 
81 
Severely 
indebted 
countries 
Regular lists published by the World Bank. For a 
country to qualify, the present value of debt service to 
GNI must exceed 80%, and the present value of debt 
service to exports must exceed 220%.  
52 
HIPC: 
Severely 
indebted poor 
countries 
Among the 52 severely indebted countries (list 
published annually by the World Bank), 42 are 
classified as HIPC. This is related to the debt relief 
measures under the HIPC programme of the World 
Bank, where countries also engage in Poverty 
Reduction Strategies – based on Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP). To become a HIPC country, 
a country must qualify under IDA (see above) or 
IMFs Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and the 
country must have an unsustainable debt situation 
after standard debt relief measures under the Paris 
Club have been attempted. 
42 
ODA (Official 
Development 
Assistance) 
For statistical purposes, the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD (DAC) publishes a list of 
aid recipients, with two different categories. Part I is 
ODA (Official Development Assistance) and Part II 
is Official Aid (OA).9 The latter includes some 
transition countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and in 
2003 also some of the forthcoming EU members), 
and a category of 25 “Advanced Developing 
Countries and Territories” including e.g. Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Korea and Israel. There is only one high-
income country (Bahrain) on the ODA list, hence 
income per capita is an important criterion. 
147 
 
                                                 
7 They score below 3.0 for the Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment 
indicator, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICU
S/0,,contentMDK:20176979~menuPK:511786~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~theS
itePK:511778,00.html#status_determined. On the other hand, there are not unambiguous 
thresholds for obtaining LICUS status. 
8 About criteria for eligibility, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:
20189587~menuPK:413944~pagePK:83988~piPK:84004~theSitePK:73154,00.html  
9 See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist 
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ODA is mainly a developing country definition that excludes high-
income countries and some transition countries. IDA is a category that 
overlaps to a considerable extent with the low-income category of the 
World Bank. Most low-income countries are included in IDA, and in 
addition around  20 others – including Indonesia and some Eastern 
European countries. HIPC and highly indebted countries are not “general” 
classifications since they focus on debt, but in the context of trade they 
could be used as supplementary criteria if there is a wish to take into 
account indebtedness. 
Hence with LDC, LLDC, SIDS, LIC, LMC, UMC, LICUS, HIPC, 
IDA and ODA there is an array of different categories that might 
potentially be used for discriminating between developing countries. In 
addition, one may use technical criteria, such as e.g. thresholds for market 
shares in the case of product graduation. Or one may use directly indexes 
for governance, indexes for vulnerability etc. that are used for constructing 
the various country lists. We shall revert to the issue of how plausible 
these criteria are. 
Say, hypothetically, that Norway would choose to give extended tariff 
preferences to any of these groups under GSP. Would this be allowed 
according to the WTO? In the following, we review some recent legal 
developments in the WTO that is relevant for the assessment.  
4. Legal background: The India-EU dispute on GSP 
GSP was allowed by a waiver in GATT until 1979, when the enabling 
clause was decided in the Tokyo Round. The enabling clause is not part of 
the GATT Agreement as such, it is a so-called decision (see GATT 1980, 
203). The enabling clause also refers to the GATT decision of 1971 on the 
establishment of “generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory” 
preferences”. The terminology is important: While “generalized” is 
sometimes erroneously spelled as “general”, the term – together with the 
word non-discriminatory – refers to preferences that apply to developing 
countries in general and not to specific groups (for example former 
colonies). The right to such preferential treatment applies to tariffs under 
GSP, and to non-tariff measures governed by multilaterally negotiated 
GATT provisions.10 
After the GSP systems were established in 1971, EEC introduced the 
Lomé convention for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Since the 
ACP preferences are not “generalized”, the EU needed a special waiver 
for this. This waiver has been extended; last time under the Doha 
Ministerial meeting in 2001. The ACP trade regime, currently under the 
Cotonou Agreement, was then granted a waiver until end-2007. Other 
WTO members only accepted this waiver after the EU agreed to modify 
its import regime for bananas, to the advantage of non-ACP suppliers.11 
                                                 
10 In the light of the current “preference erosion” debate, it is of interest to observe that 
paragraph 3b of the enabling clause states that SDT “shall not constitute an impediment 
to the reduction or elimination of tariffs or other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured 
nation basis” (ibid., 204). 
11 See www.wto.org, WTO document WT/MIN(01)/15, European Communities — the 
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, decision of 14 November 2001. 
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The EU is currently negotiating so-called Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries. These will have a stronger 
element of reciprocity, and their WTO-legality may then be secured 
through WTOs rules for free trade agreements.  
In addition to the “everything but arms” (EBA) regime for the LDCs 
and the ACP regime, the EU has also given extended trade preferences for 
two other country groups: 
- The Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT), consisting of 21 areas 
with small populations. 
- The “Countries fighting drugs” group, comprising 11 Latin American 
countries and Pakistan.12 
In 2002, India challenged the 
EU “drugs” regime for being 
discriminatory (see textbox). 
India also challenged 
discrimination based on 
labour rights and 
environmental standards, but 
later withdrew the 
complaint.13 
After panel ruling and 
appeal by the EU, the WTO 
Appelate Body finally 
decided that the EU drugs 
regime was inconsistent with 
WTO rules. This ruling is 
important because it clarifies 
to some extent the legal 
options for GSP. Our 
interpretation of the 
Appellate Body (WTO 2004) 
decision is as follows:  
- A GSP donor may give 
different treatment to 
different developing 
countries. 
- Such discrimination 
without any explicit 
authorisation is possible only for the LDCs. 
- For other developing countries, discrimination has to be based on 
objective criteria, so that all developing countries fulfilling these 
criteria obtain similar benefits. 
- The criteria have to be related to the “development, financial and trade 
needs” of developing countries. Here the Appellate Body overturned 
the earlier Panel decision: According to the Panel, the needs of all 
                                                 
12 On OCT, see Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) 30 November 2001, 
on Drugs, see OJ 31 December 2001 and various information material, e.g. EU 
Commission (2004). 
13 The reason was apparently that India itself had not been “materially affected” by this; 
not that India “gave up” the case.  
India’s complaint about EU’s GSP  
 
In its complaint (WT/DS246/1, G/L/521,  
12 March 2002), India e.g. stated: 
 
“India is particularly concerned about the
following conditions: 
 
1. The tariff preferences accorded under
the special tariff arrangements for
combating drug production and trafficking
are available only to specified countries
selected by the EC;  and 
 
2. The tariff preferences accorded under
the special incentive arrangements for the
protection of labour rights and the
environment are accorded only to countries
that meet labour and environmental policy
standards determined by the EC. 
 
India considers that the tariff preferences
accorded under these special arrangements
create undue difficulties for India's exports to
the EC, including for those under the general
arrangements of the EC's GSP scheme, and
nullify or impair the benefits accruing to India
under the most-favoured-nation provisions of
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and paragraphs
2(a), 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause.” 
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developing countries had to be considered; the Appellate Body decided 
that the consideration might apply to less than all developing countries 
(ibid., 64, 71).  
- The objective standards cannot be any assertion about needs, but 
“Broad-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO 
agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by multilateral 
organizations, could serve as such a standard.” (ibid., 66) 
- Finally, such discrimination should not impose unjustifiable burdens 
on other Members. 
EUs drug scheme was inconsistent with the enabling clause because the 
benefits were not available to all developing countries facing a similar 
situation. If the EU had created a drug regime with clear rules for 
inclusion and exclusion, available to all developing countries, it is likely 
that it would have passed the legal test. The EU has chosen not to do so; it 
abandoned the drug regime from 1 July 2005 as part of the current 
revision of its GSP system.14 
Which of the smorgasbord presented in the last paragraph would be 
acceptable in the light of this legal interpretation? If e.g. Norway granted 
extended preferences to LLDC, SIDS, LIC, LICUS, HIC, HIPC, LMC, 
IDA or ODA; which list would be WTO-legal? It is impossible to tell this 
with certainty, since WTO law interpretation may be modified and 
developed in later disputes, or by WTO decisions. Most of these lists are 
based on objective criteria, and if these criteria were made explicit in cases 
where this openness is missing, there should be no problem arguing for the 
development relevance of the criteria involved. The LLDC and SIDS 
definitions might have to be sharpened for such a purpose.  
Some of the country groups referred to here were constructed for non-
trade purposes, and some of the more narrow cases (e.g. LICUS, HIPC) do 
not seem fit to be major criteria in a trade context. Hence if such 
classifications were to be used in the GSP context, the pure income criteria 
(LIC, LMC) or income with supplementary criteria (IDA, ODA) may be 
relevant. It would also be possible to construct any combination of criteria 
(for example, IDA+LIC+LLDC, or the like).  
5. Characterising groups 
Having established that some of the categorisations mentioned above 
might be WTO-legal, we approach the issue of whether discrimination of 
any kind is actually warranted. As a first step, we shall study the 
differences between the various lists. Table 3 gives more intuition about 
the characteristics and relative importance of the different groups. In the 
table, the income-based definitions use 2002 data for GNI per capita, from 
the World Bank (Atlas method). The categories in the table are: 
- LDC, LIC, IDA: As explained above. LDC and IDA based on current 
lists. 
- 1000$: All countries with GNI per capita below 1000 $. 
- LIC+LMC: Low income + lower middle income countries. 
                                                 
14 See www.wto.org for material on dispute No. DS246 for documentation on deadlines, 
arbitration etc., and Official Journal of the European Communities 30.6.2005 on the new 
GSP regime of the EU. 
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- +UMC: LIC+LMC+UMC: Also including upper middle income 
countries. 
- +HIGHINC: LIC+LMC+UMC+Korea+non-OECD high-income 
countries.  
These seven categories are more or less alternative definitions of 
developing countries, ranging from extremely narrow (LDCs) to very 
broad (including all high-income countries. In the table, we also include 
the “supplementary” categories SIDS, LLDC and severely indebted. These 
are: 
- SIDS 1: SIDS definition with 37 countries from the web page of the 
UN High Representative. 
- SIDS 2: Unofficial UNCTAD list of 29 countries from Encontre 
(2004). 
- LLDC: List of 30 countries from UNCTAD. 
- Severely indebted: 52 countries based on current World Bank 
classification (May 2005). 
In the table, it should be observed that the number of observations varies 
between columns. Only for population do we have 100% data coverage. 
The less data, the less accurate are the results; hence it should be observed 
that the shares are based on the available data only. In general, however, 
we believe that the table provides a reliable picture, and the data coverage 
is rather high. In the table, we show the percentage of world population 
covered by data on each variable. This is between 90 and 100% for all 
variables except poverty. For poverty, the figure is 77-78%. Here it should 
be recalled that poverty data are not systematically provided for rich 
countries, which account for 15% of the world’s population. Given that 
there are few people living below 1$ a day in rich countries, the “real” 
data coverage is certain to be above 90%.  
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Table 3: The relative size of various categories of developing countries: 
Share of world total (%) for different variables. 
Category Imports Exports Agric. Exports 
Income 
(GNI) 
Income 
(PPP) 
Popu- 
lation 
Poor 
1$ 
Poor 
2$ 
LDC (50) 0.71 0.60 0.67 0.53 1.76 11.09 17.04 12.90 
LIC (61) 2.48 2.35 2.86 2.74 9.26 36.63 68.64 59.24 
IDA (81) 3.34 3.41 4.69 3.49 11.03 40.80 70.71 64.28 
1000$ (67) 7.80 8.59 8.15 7.48 23.17 60.38 91.64 88.49 
LIC+LMC (117) 15.44 16.58 20.01 13.70 36.85 79.14 98.16 98.15 
+UMC (154) 23.69 25.67 29.96 18.91 43.44 84.47 100.00 100.00 
+HIGHINC. (182) 34.14 37.12 31.68 21.67 47.42 86.04 100.00 100.00 
SIDS (1) (37) 2.27 2.23 1.31 0.46 0.59 0.83 0.02 0.04 
SIDS (2) (29) 0.27 0.17 0.35 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.02 0.03 
LLDC (30) 0.59 0.53 1.16 0.33 1.12 5.44 10.31 7.21 
Severely indebted (52) 3.67 4.06 10.81 3.75 7.89 14.37 17.04 9.56 
Observations 216 216 150 172 229 233 97 88 
% of world pop. 
covered by data 100 100 91 97 100 100 78 77 
Year of data 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2001+other 
Data source WDI WDI COM- TRADE WDI 
WDI, 
CWF WDI 
WDI Table 5 
WB web pages 
Note: WDI= World Development Indicators 2004, or later WDI data on the World Bank’s web pages (for 
poverty). CWF=CIA World Factbook (also used to supplement trade and income data). 
 
The LDCs is a small group in economic terms, covering 0.5-0.7% of 
world trade or nominal income, 1.8% of real income, 11% of the world’s 
population, and 13-17% of the world’s poor. With the reservation that 
LDC may be slightly underrepresented due to missing data, only a modest 
proportion of the world’s poor are in the LDCs. Our poverty headcount 
data at the country level cover 986 million people at 1$ a day, and 168 of 
these are found in the LDCs.15 
In low-income category, the populous countries in South Asia are 
added (in addition to Bangladesh, which is an LDC), and all shares are 
approximately multiplied by four. The LICs include 2/3 of the world’s 
poorest, but less than 3% of the world economy in nominal terms. 
With IDA, we add Indonesia and 20 other countries, but the shares are 
only modestly affected. Moving to 1000$, however, China is included. 
The figures on economic size are then doubled, and another 1/5 of the 
world’s poor is added. Including the whole group of lower middle income 
countries, including Brazil, Russia, Thailand and others, the economic 
importance increases further to 14-20%. Now we include almost all global 
poverty.  
                                                 
15 For the LDCs, we have poverty data for countries representing 2/3 of their combined 
population. If the poverty incidence is the same for the countries with missing data, the 
figure would increase to 254 million. With complete data for all countries, it is likely that 
the share of poverty in the LDCs would be above 1/5. Even if this is a substantial share, it 
remains true the majority of poor people worldwide are outside the LDCs.  
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Adding the upper middle income countries – including countries such 
as Argentina, Malaysia and Mexico – increases the economic size further, 
but there are just a few more poor people to include. The high-income 
countries that are normally considered as developing countries in the 
WTO constitute a relatively small group in economic terms, even if Korea 
is included in our data. With the broadest possible definition of developing 
countries, including Korea and high-income countries outside the OECD, 
the developing countries cover approximately 1/3 of world trade, and 22% 
of world nominal income. 
Most people would agree that defining developing countries (DCs) as 
the LDCs would be too narrow, and that including high-income countries 
in the DC concept may be questioned. There is however no scientific 
solution to this problem; any threshold is adjustable and depends on the 
criteria we set. For example, Norway has BNI per capita almost three 
times higher than Korea. So Korea may legitimately feel “DC” compared 
to Norway. 
Using such income thresholds, the data also illustrate that some 
countries switch position each year. For example, Russia was lower 
middle until 2004, when is moved to upper middle. The same occurred for 
Botswana, that was even an LDC until the early 1990s.  
In research on the world income distribution, a well-known feature is 
the existence of a “bimodal” distribution with few in the middle (see e.g. 
Quah 1996). If we undertake a “cluster analysis” to see “which countries 
belong together”, is likely that a cut-off point between North and South 
will appear somewhere in the middle. Diagram 1 illustrates this “sparsely 
populated middle”, showing the cumulative share of world exports, with 
countries ranked by income levels. The diagram only shows the lower 
range of the distribution (142 out of 171 countries where we have data on 
both variables).  
The diagram is also relevant in the context of trade policy, by showing 
“how much competition” that will come if trade preferences below certain 
income thresholds are granted. 
 
                              Trade policy differentiation between developing countries under GSP schemes        13 
  
Diagram 1: The poor countries' share of world exports (2002)
(142 countries and territories, ranked by BNI per capita)
Data sources: World Development Indicators 2004, CIA World Factbook.
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In the income ranges up to 4500 USD, there are many countries (127 for 
which we have data). After that, however, there are fewer. Between 4500 
and 10000$ there are only 15 countries. Hence the diagram illustrates the 
“sparsely populated middle” in the world income distribution. Above 
10000$, we find 29 rich countries (not shown in the diagram) that 
represent more than 70% of world exports.  
In the Diagram, we also show the positions of Botswana and Namibia, 
that obtain special preferences in the Norwegian GSP system. Both were 
LMC based on 2002 data, but – as noted – Botswana has now moved to 
UMC. Botswana is richer than Brazil and a number of other large 
agricultural exporters. According to “objective criteria”, it may be difficult 
to explain this differential treatment. 
A diagram showing shares of world income would be quite similar. 
For shares of world agricultural exports, the curve is also similar, but with 
some modifications for the DCs, shown in Diagram 2. 
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Diagram 2: The DC's share of world agricultural exports, 2002
Based on data for 133 countries (104 shown)
Data sources: World Development Indicators 2003, COMTRADE.
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Agriculture is important for more countries so that some of the flat 
segments in Diagram 1 disappear (e.g. in the income range between 
Indonesia and China). The relative importance of the large countries is 
also changed; Brazil is more important than China for agriculture, and 
Argentina (GNI per capita at 4220) is a major exporter (the third largest 
after Brazil and China). Third, developing countries with an income level 
above 6000$ do not add much to the DC share: Beyond 6000$, the curve 
is flat. 
The diagrams shed light on Table 1 above. The economic size of each 
group is strongly affected by which larger countries that are included. For 
example, the LIC group is much larger than LDCs mainly because it 
includes India and Indonesia. With the 1000$ threshold we include China, 
and the economic magnitudes jumps sharply. In the lower middle income 
group we find Thailand, Russia and Brazil, which also add significantly to 
the cumulative share of LIC+LMC. In the +UMC group we add 37 new 
countries including e.g. Malaysia, and Mexico, and Argentina for 
agriculture, so the trade share rises further.16  
Diagrams 1 and 2 illustrate that if we use statistical techniques to 
identify clusters, we are likely to find a cut-off point between rich and 
poor in the 5-10000$ range. This cut-off point is likely to be inside the 
                                                 
16 Table 1 does not show ODA, but this would be close to the +UMC category (somewhat 
below due to the exclusion of Russia etc.). 
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upper middle income category.17 The ODA classification conforms with 
this, except that Russia and many other Central/Eastern European 
countries statistically belongs to the lower group. 
6. Reasons and criteria for differentiation 
The basic idea behind unilateral preferences is that market access is s good 
thing that should be given to those that need it more. The definition of 
who needs it more may be based purely distributional reasoning (the 
poorest should have more), or “functional” reasoning – e.g. that countries 
should be compensated for particular problems. In the functional 
reasoning we find concepts such as smallness, landlocked-ness, 
indebtedness, remoteness and vulnerability. As seen above, vulnerability 
is defined by various characteristics such as exposure to natural disasters, 
income volatility etc. The LDC vulnerability index in fact also includes 
smallness.  
In terms of economic theory, the concepts of smallness, landlocked-
ness and remoteness may all be defended in the light of the new trade 
theory and economic geography. For example, Redding and Venables 
(2004) show that being landlocked reduces income by 24%, being an 
island by 7% and closing the borders by 20-27%. Being remote also 
matters: Moving Zimbabwe to the location of Hungary would increase its 
income by 80%. All these effects are due to various forms of scale 
economies. Being economically remote is however only partly determined 
by nature; if all African countries grow economically, Zimbabwe will no 
longer be so remote. Remote Pacific islands might however have a 
problem of remoteness by nature; there is not much land around. Land 
transports are on the whole more costly than sea transports (WTO 2002), 
and this may explain why landlocked countries are worse off than islands. 
In terms of transport costs, islands are nevertheless worse off than 
continental countries with access to the sea (ibid.). The impact of 
smallness is more ambiguous; Easterly and Kraay (1999) e.g. find that 
micro-states experience more volatility but are actually better off 
economically, on average. WTO (2002) also finds a similar relationship. 
facing this, it is no surprise that the SIDS proponents have had problems to 
convince the world community about the merits of their message. 
Encontre (1999) also notes, in his analysis of SIDS, that the frequency of 
natural disasters did not have a statistically significant impact on growth. 
In his defence for the SIDS concept, he focuses on the combination of 
smallness, remoteness, high transport costs, a narrow resource base and 
non-diversified economies. 
Even if some of the criteria for special treatment are supported, it is 
not certain that trade policy or the GSP system is the right way of 
addressing these problems. If poverty is the problem; one should not need 
criteria related to the causes as well. Hence if e.g. smallness leads to 
                                                 
17 From non-Norwegian sources (and not the OECD itself), we have had access to the 
OECD Secretariat cluster analyses undertaken in 2001-2002 in order to examine criteria 
for trade policy graduation. These created considerable controversies since OECD 
includes Korea, an obvious candidate for graduation.  The discussion above illustrates 
why cluster analysis is likely to put Korea in the rich group. 
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poverty in some cases, it is the effect that matters. Hence even if some the 
functional arguments are sensible, it is not so clear how much can be won 
by adding these criteria in addition to income. It is true that income is not 
a perfect measure of well-being, but it is a simple indicator that is 
correlated with a large number of other “good things”: Easterly (1999) 
examines 81 alternative indicators of living conditions, and finds that 61 
of these were positively and significantly correlated with income, and in 
32 case income was a strong determining factor. Hence in spite of some 
weaknesses, income is a universal criterion that is simple. By using 
income, one also avoids that all WTO members come with their alleged 
handicaps, in order to obtain better market access. The current WTO 
policy of “no more special categories” therefore seems to be well advised. 
Even if we conclude, “income is the best proxy we have”, the problem 
remains that the income thresholds do not follow. As noted above, the 
World Bank income thresholds were originally based on additional criteria 
related to living standards. Hence the World Bank income categories are 
not clean measures of income; the thresholds are affected by other criteria. 
These thresholds are created for specific purposes, and it is not evident 
that the low-income level of the World Bank is better than e.g. 1000$. 
Hence we should treat all thresholds with some pragmatism. Since these 
thresholds are in some sense arbitrary, it would be an advantage to design 
trade preferences so that the difference due to such thresholds is too 
dramatic. For example, if tariffs are cut from 15 % to zero for 
LDC+LIC+IDA, they could be cut to 5% for LMC, and to 10% for UMC. 
In this way, the impact of thresholds is not too dramatic, and measurement 
errors in GNI per capita will not have too dramatic effects. 
If income thresholds are used pragmatically in this way, an issue is 
whether they should be supplemented by other measures. Concerns for 
financial aspects is written into the WTO framework, and reflected in e.g. 
IDA or HIPC. Along with income, this is also a measure of economic 
performance rather than a cause. “Financial needs” is already written into 
the enabling clause, and there seems to be no legal or conceptual problem 
of adding debt criteria. Using IDA, the may not be a need for this. 
If we rely on income as a main criterion for differentiation, we are 
back to the distributional reasons for differentiation. A fair criterion would 
then be to have GSP benefits that are inversely related to poverty. Given 
that it is impractical to have one tariff for each country, a possible option 
is to differentiate by classes, e.g. (i) LDC, (ii) LIC+IDA, (iii) 
LIC+IDA+LMC, (iv) +UMC. How many steps is a pragmatic 
consideration; with 5% MFN tariffs it is better to give zero tariffs to all. 
But in a situation with gradual liberalisation, such an approach might be 
taken.  
Instead of this variety of “fairness”, another approach would be the 
“Rawlsian” one – to give it all to the poorest. Having concern only for the 
LDCs would be the trade policy equivalent. Considering the amount of 
poverty outside the LDCs, most people would find this to be an 
implausible argument. As stated by Hoekman et al. (2003), “ preferences 
should focus on the poor, wherever they are located, and not on a limited 
set of countries”.  
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7. The political economy of “supply constraints” 
When the World Bank set its income thresholds, resource availability was 
also an aspect considered. For trade policy, a similar concern for import 
competition or the “cost of liberalisation” may apply. For example, 
countries may fear import competition from India, Brazil or China, and 
therefore prefer to give generous trade preferences only the LDCs. If there 
is a political pressure to help the poor, a focus on the LDCs may then act 
as a lightning rod. In the debate on agricultural protection in Norway, 
some people e.g. argue that Norway should reduce trade barriers in order 
to help developing countries. According to the farmers’ lobby, however, 
Brazil is not a “real” developing country, and we should focus on the very 
poorest countries. Facing competition from the “industrial” agriculture of 
Brazil, small-scale farmers in the LDCs should form an alliance with 
farmers in Norway in order to avoid too much liberalisation. While we do 
not question the true concerns about poverty expressed by Norwegian 
farmers, we believe that it is too narrow to focus only on the LDC’s, that 
account for 0.6% of world exports or a meagre 0.2% of Norway’s imports.  
In the following, we shall use an international trade model in order to 
shed some light in these issues. Experience with trade preferences to the 
poorest suggests that the trade created is modest, and this is in turn 
interpreted as an indication of “supply constraints”. As a theoretical 
illustration of supply constraints, we may use a model of Melchior (2004): 
This is a neoclassical trade model where two countries use capital and 
labour in the production of two different goods; one labour-intensive and 
the other capital-intensive. In the model, the poor country may become 
fully specialised in the L-intensive good if is has too little capital. 
Furthermore, if its capital-labour ratio is below what is most efficient in 
the production of L-intensive goods, the poor country becomes a less 
efficient producer. Hence the supply limitation of the poorest country is 
created by a too low capital-labour ratio. Since the poorest countries have 
too little human or physical capital, they are less efficient and export less 
to the North. As the capital-labour ratio in the South grows, it becomes 
more efficient and labour-intensive exports grow. At some stage, however, 
the country starts producing the capital-intensive good as well, and exports 
of L-intensive goods decline as the K/L ratio increases further. In this 
range, factor prices become equalised if there is free trade.  
Diagram 3 shows, by numerical simulation of the model, how exports 
of L-intensive goods from the South to the North depend on the capital-
labour ratio in the South, for a given capital-labour ratio in the North 
(equal to k2 in the diagram). 
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Diagram 3: Exports of  L-intensive goods 
from South to North
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Here the horizontal axis measures the capital-labour ratio in the South, k2 
is the similar ratio in the North, and k1A is the turning point when the 
South starts producing both labour- and capital-intensive goods. Diagram 
4 shows the corresponding wages in the North and in the South. 
 
Diagram 4: Wages in the North and the South
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To the left in the diagrams, where the South is inefficient due to “too little 
capital”, imports is not much of a threat in the North, but with a rising 
capital/labour ratio, the South becomes more efficient and this reduces the 
Northern wage. To the right of the horizontal line when the South 
                              Trade policy differentiation between developing countries under GSP schemes        19 
  
becomes diversified, the two wage curves coincide since there is factor 
price equalisation. 
Although the model is made with two countries only, we may use it to 
shed some light on “supply capacity” and its possible impact on trade 
policy. We may think of LDCs as located far to the left in Diagram 3, 
China somewhere along the rising portion of the curve, and Korea on the 
falling curve to the right. Observe that when the “threat of imports” from 
China is at its largest, further capital accumulation in China will lead to a 
reduction in L-intensive exports. Hence when the threat of import 
competition is at its greatest, it disappears. In a sense, the best way of 
getting rid of competition from China is to let it grow further and 
accumulate more capital, so that its wage level rises. Due to the size of 
China, this may take more time than it did in e.g. Hong Kong or Korea, 
but the principle should be the same. Some analysts have predicted that 
China could experience labour shortage in 10-15 years. 
For LDCs, the presence of large labour-abundant competitors like 
China leads to a downward pressure on wages and world prices of labour-
intensive goods. The best way of changing this situation will also be to let 
China grow further so that its wage level rises. In order to help the LDCs, 
we should let China follow Korea to the right in the diagram.18 According 
to this line of reasoning, it would be a bad idea to have a trade policy that 
prevents further growth in China, by restricting imports from China. If 
LDC trade is allowed while China trade is restricted, the static gain for 
LDCs might be larger, but in the long run, the LDCs will gain from fast 
structural change and rising wages in China. 
In the case illustrated above, the LDC has the most limited supply 
capacity, and improved market access for this will generate less North-
South trade than free trade with China. According to the model, it can be 
shown that the relative welfare improvement will be larger for the LDC 
than for China. In the North, welfare gains are greater in the case of trade 
with China, but the impact on wages is stronger.19 If welfare 
considerations determine trade policy in the north, it should allow imports 
from China at least as much as imports from LDCs. But if labour in the 
North influences trade policy, it would prefer to trade more with the LDC 
since it makes less harm. Hence the model is a simple illustration of the 
political economy involved:  Workers, or farmers, may prefer free trade 
with LDCs because they fear the competition from China or Brazil.  
According to Hoekman et al. (2003), it is economically sensible but 
politically unrealistic that rich countries will provide unlimited preferential 
market access to large countries such as China and India. For this reason, 
they suggest a greater focus on multilateral liberalisation for goods of 
particular interest to developing countries in general. This illustrates the 
interaction between trade preferences and multilateral trade rules. On the 
other hand, precisely this interaction has also resulted in the conflict on 
“preference erosion” – where countries with favourable trade preferences 
resist multilateral trade liberalisation that will undermine these 
advantages. 
                                                 
18 This does not follow from the model, which contains no dynamics and only two 
countries; we only use the model as a device to structure the discussion. 
19 For details, see article on www.nupi.no. 
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8. Preference erosion 
As a consequence of this potential alliance between LDCs and workers in 
the North, there is even a risk that trade policy could become blocked in a 
situation with free trade for the poorest only, and more restricted trade for 
the more efficient developing countries. The current debate on preference 
erosion; where some of the poorest WTO members, is an indication of this 
problem. Although we agree that the problem of preference erosion is real 
for some poor countries and should be addressed, it seems wise to avoid 
such problems in the future.20  
The “preference erosion” debate is particularly related to EU 
preferences for the ACP countries. In the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, some Caribbean countries feared that multilateral trade 
liberalisation could undermine their preferences. In the current “Doha 
development agenda”, similar concerns have been voiced. Table A in the 
Appendix shows calculations by various authors attempting to trace the 
possible losers from preference erosion. The Table shows that the 
countries with the relatively large losses (based on these studies) are 
Mauritius, Guyana and Swaziland. For these countries, the main losses are 
expected to arise from the loss of preferences for sugar under the ACP 
regime. Other countries such as Barbados and Fiji (sugar), and Botswana 
and Namibia (meat) also face losses according to some studies. Preference 
erosion has also been a theme related to the elimination of textile quotas, 
where some countries fear losing market shares to China and other strong 
suppliers after 1.1.2005 (see e.g. Mlachila and Yang 2004). Looking at 
competition with China as a zero-sum game may however not be 
appropriate: Lall and Albaladejo (2004) show that at least in East Asia, 
China is promoting rather than replacing the exports of its neighbours. 
This however depends on the technology characteristics of exports, and 
exports of low-tech labour-intensive goods may have more problems with 
the direct competition from China. As noted above, further growth in 
China may also be important for other developing country in a long-run 
dynamic perspective.  
Regarding losses from preference erosion, the method applied is 
important for the results. Some studies do not fully account for the 
increase in world market prices due to liberalisation. For example, the 
sugar market is heavily distorted by export subsidies and ACP countries 
losing some of their sales to EU could increase their sales to other 
countries. Norway is a good example; we import more all less all our 
sugar consumption from the EU, where it has been refined after the raw 
materials have been imported from developing countries. As shown by 
e.g. Milner et al. (2003), some ACP will gain rather than lose from EU 
sugar reform, if changed world market prices are accounted for. Using the 
world trade model GTAP, Kerkelä and Huan-Niemi (2005) also find that 
some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gain from reform, and for some of 
them, the change is modest. A substantial loss for Mauritius nevertheless 
                                                 
20 In WTO document TN/MA/W/51/Add.1, dated 11 March 2005, The ACP countries 
suggest methodologies for identifying products for which preference erosion is important. 
The implicit proposal is that MFN liberalisation should be slower for these products. 
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remains. And the world trade model clearly shows that Brazil is the big 
winner.  
Estimates on preference erosion generally also assume that the rent 
from preferences is fully captured by the exporting country. In recent 
years, research on rent sharing has made it clear that this assumption is 
not plausible. The rent due to a tariff preference could be captured by the 
exporter, by the importer, by the importing country (if there are auctions), 
or by the consumers (if the price is lowered). Olarreaga and Özden (2005) 
examine prices for clothing exports to the U.S. under the preference 
scheme AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and conclude 
that exporters on average receive 1/3 of the tariff rent. The poorer is the 
exporting country, the lower is this share. The more concentration there is 
on the importer side, the smaller is the rent obtained by the exporter. Silva 
(2005) analysed US-Latin America trade and found that importers capture 
an even higher share of the rent due to preferences, in some cases more 
than 95%.21 If these estimates should turn out to be representative, some 
estimates on the losses from preference erosion may be reduced 
substantially. Losses in the form of reduced employment and value added 
may remain, however. 
A survey undertaken among a limited number of Norwegian importers 
(25) in the agriculture sector indicated that entry barriers are higher in the 
poorest countries, and the presence of limited competition in these markets 
is therefore more likely. In the light of the study referred to above, an 
interesting issue is whether the rents from exclusive preferences to the 
poorest countries may to a lesser extent be transferred to the exporters. 
While we consider this to be likely, it need not be the case – if the 
exporters also have market power. 
Regarding textiles and clothing and the fear of preference erosion, 
Norway is an interesting case since quotas have been abandoned before 
this occurred in the EU and the USA.22 In the case of Norway, Bangladesh 
benefited from the absence of quotas during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when other suppliers were restrained. This led to a considerable 
increase in Norway’s textile imports from Bangladesh, as shown in 
Diagram 5. 
 
                                                 
21 Silva also shows that lobbying from importers is an important determinant of the 
magnitude of trade preferences. Rents from preferential imports may be reason from this. 
22 We have used the past form since this should have happened from 1 january 2005. 
However, some new restrictions have been introduced later, so it may be too early to 
celebrate the complete elimination of textile quotas in the EU or the USA. 
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Diagram 5: Norway's imports of textiles and clothing from 
Bangladesh, 1976-2004 (Data source: COMTRADE)
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From the mid-1980s, other suppliers were restrained by MFA agreements 
while Bangladesh could expand freely. In addition, Bangladesh had zero 
tariffs as an LDC. The phasing-out of Norwegian textile quotas during the 
1990s, and the reduction of Bangladesh’s tariff preference, has certainly 
led to a strong erosion of the Bangladesh preference. Clothing imports 
have nevertheless continued to accelerate, so here there is no sign of 
adverse effects.23 Hence at least in the case of Norway, the fear of losses 
due to the elimination of textile quotas has not materialised. 
On the whole, analysis of preference erosion as well as general 
equilibrium assessment of WTO liberalisation suggest that the problem of 
preference erosion is important for a limited number of countries 
concerned, but in pure economic terms of little importance for the world 
economy. The trade policy repercussions of preference erosion may 
however indirectly lead to greater economic effects: If preference erosion 
has the political effect of hindering trade liberalisation to the benefit of 
other developing countries, it will have a strong negative impact on others 
– in the form of “gains from trade liberalisation foregone” (see also Limão 
and Olarreaga 2005).24 Özden and Reinhardt (2003) provide empirical 
support for the hypothesis that GSP tends to make beneficiary countries 
less liberal in trade policy. Hence the potentially serious costs of 
preference erosion for the world economy is more related to its indirect 
political than its direct economic effect. As also shown by Hoekman et al. 
(2002), a uniform non-discriminatory tariff combined with direct 
                                                 
23 Bangladesh export data for SITC 84 Clothing are available from the COMTRADE 
database for 2001 and 2003. These suggest that there has not been a sharp import 
increase. We do not have an explanation of this. Given that Bangladesh ranks high on 
international lists of corruption, the possibility of re-routing of goods from other 
countries could be checked, or false declarations on the origin of goods. We do not, 
however, have any evidence suggesting that this is the case. 
24 In order to avoid the political impact of preference erosion, the authors also suggest 
replacing preferences with an import subsidy for small developing countries. 
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assistance to the poorest countries may be better from a global welfare 
point of view. 
The literature on preference erosion suggests that trade preferences 
certainly work, if they are large enough. On the other hand, temporary 
preferences that cannot be sustained in the long run may create serious 
adjustment problems in countries suffering from preference erosion. In 
this way, the help can turn into a problem. Trade preferences that are 
strongly discriminatory between different developing countries have 
adverse consequences for trade policy that may create losses for other 
developing countries by blocking trade policy progress.  
As a consequence of these problems with preference erosion, it seems 
well advised to design GSP systems in order to avoid them in the future. 
Mega-preferences of several hundred percentage points for a few countries 
should be avoided, in order to avoid non-unsustainable trade and 
subsequent adjustment problems. Preferences should be designed so that 
there is real competition between suppliers, in order to secure that the 
resulting trade is sustainable. This could either be obtained by including 
more countries, or by having “gradual differentiation” so that e.g. LDCs 
face competition from LICs or LMCs, LMCs face competition from 
UMCs and so on.  
By delaying improvements in market access for other DCs, very large 
preferences to LDC, ACP and the like may on the whole have an adverse 
impact for developing countries. This is an additional argument for 
spreading the benefits more evenly. The “supply constraint” argument 
suggests that extended preferences should be given also to the “second 
poorest” in order to promote trade and welfare gains. While ways and 
means should be found to handle real problems of preference erosion, 
these problems should not be exaggerated – as our Bangladesh illustration 
suggests.  
Growth in the more successful developing countries will also generate 
import demand that will promote exports from their neighbour developing 
countries. This has been shown in the case of China. Increased trade 
between adjacent developing countries has to be a core aspect of their 
development, and this should not be interrupted by “artificial” exports to 
Norway generated by mega-preferences. If increased trade between 
developing countries is slowed down due to the preference erosion 
dilemma, is will most likely have a negative overall impact on 
development. 
9. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this paper has been to present a menu and some arguments 
relating to differentiation in GSP systems. The discussion is relevant for 
several issues with respect to Norway’s GSP system: 
1. Should Russia and other Eastern European states obtain GSP? 
According to income criteria, the answer would be affirmative. 
2. Should Hong Kong and Korea be graduated from GSP? According to 
plausible definitions of developing countries, the answer is yes. In 
order to continue its free trade policy for these countries, Norway 
24           Arne Melchior 
  
could negotiate free trade agreements, as it has already done with 
Singapore and is about to do with Korea. 
3. Is it plausible to continue with the special preferences given to 
Botswana and Namibia? According to the “objective criterion” 
approach, this could be difficult unless other LMC are given similar 
preferences. Another option would be to negotiate market access in 
agriculture under the FTA with SACU that is already under 
negotiation. In that case, South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho would 
also be included. 
4. The arguments provided here suggest that the division into LDC and 
other developing countries may in some cases not be appropriate. 
Several arguments suggest that “mega-preferences” only to the LDCs 
should be avoided, in order to (i) stimulate competition among 
countries and between traders, to avoid non-sustainable trade as well 
as monopoly situations; (ii) to avoid that better market access for other 
developing countries is hampered by problems of “preference 
erosion”; (iii) to provide market access to developing countries with a 
larger supply capacity so that more trade is generated; (iv) to soften the 
impact of thresholds and group delineations that are always to some 
extent arbitrary. Fairness is also a valid reason for improving market 
access beyond LDCs. In the text, we have indicated some possible 
ways of differentiating within the GSP system. 
In our discussion, we have focused on GSP and differential market access 
provisions. The discussion on trade policy differentiation is also relevant 
for trade-related aid, and for multilateral rules on SDT. To some extent, 
the WTO is currently trapped in its crude division of countries into 
industrial, developing and LDCs without specific criteria for the two 
former. The richest “developing” countries fear losing some privileges, 
and the broad definition of developing countries also implies that SDT 
provisions may apply “too generally”. There is need for a  WTO reform in 
the field, in spite of the considerable political difficulties involved. Some 
of the aspects discussed here are also relevant  in that context. 
On trade-related aid, there is no doubt that the need is largest in the 
poorest countries, but the “second poorest” also have such needs. A 
difference is that some poor countries, such as e.g. China, receive 
considerable amounts of international investment. While China urgently 
needs market access, the need for aid may be relatively less urgent.  
Our general conclusion is nevertheless that in order to promote 
development and erase poverty we should not only help the poorest 
countries, but also the second poorest. The LDCs certainly need our 
support and our trade preferences, but around 4/5 of the world’s poor are 
in other countries that also need market access.   
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Table A1: Losers from preference erosion, according to different studies 
 Alexandraki et al. (2004) 
Milner et al. 
(2004) 
Grynberg et 
al. (2004) 
Import nations covered Quad World Quad 
Products covered All goods Sugar Beef ,Sugar Bananas 
Figures depict: % GDP loss Rent change per capita 
Welf. change 
mill. USD 
Main  
products 
Mauritius -4.4 -103.00 -88 Sugar 
Textiles 
St. Lucia -0.6  -6 Bananas 
Belize -2.1 -27.76 -16 Sugar 
Bananas 
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.8 28.24  Sugar 
Guyana -5.8 -51.24 -30 Sugar 
Fiji -2.2 -33.95 -63 Sugar 
Dominica -0.9  -2 Bananas 
Seychelles -1.6   Various 
Jamaica -0.6 -12.42 -41 Sugar 
Bananas Textiles 
St. Vincent/ Grenadines -4.3  -3 Bananas 
Albania -1.0   Textiles 
Swaziland -5.8 -13.96 -20 Sugar 
Serbia and Montenegro -3.9   Various 
Tunisia -2.5   Textiles 
Cote d’Ivoire -3.7 0.04  Bananas 
Morocco -1.8   Textiles 
Dominican Rep. -2.7  -5 Sugar 
Bananas Textiles 
Trinidad and Tobago  -7.22  Sugar 
Malawi  -0.59  Sugar 
Madagascar  -0.19  Sugar 
Zambia  0.51  Sugar 
Tanzania  -0.09  Sugar 
Kenya  -0.03  Sugar 
Congo, Rep.  0.82 -5 Sugar 
Botswana   -32 Beef 
Namibia   -22 Beef 
Barbados  -43.01 -12 Sugar 
Suriname  0.00 -2 Bananas 
Cameroon   -10 Bananas 
Mozambique   -3 Sugar 
Zimbabwe  0.16   
Uganda  0   
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